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Abstract:  
 
At present, in the era of globalization, the banking sector failure in one country can cause 
negative externalities for the financial institutions of other states. The fundamental problem 
of implementing standards based on Basel II is that these standards contribute to the 
development of pro-cyclicality of banking regulation.  
 
The authors emphasize the need to design such a regulatory system, which should contribute 
to innovative development and at the same time restrain socially dubious novelties. 
Therefore, the article substantiates the need to increase the size of the capital “buffer”, 
which is intended to address the problem of improving the financial situation and increasing 
the financial viability of the largest banks and banking systems.  
 
This reduces risks and increases the capital “safety cushion”, as well as optimizes the impact 
on the commercial banks behavior caused by the use of counter-cyclical capital regulation 
requirements. 
 
The conducted research supported the hypothesis put forward by the authors that when 
forming a countercyclical capital buffer it is necessary to focus on indicators of: return on 
assets of the banking system (ROА) and return on equity (ROE), depending on GDP growth, 
but this dependence does not become evident immediately, but with a time lag of 1 year. The 
object of the research is the banking system of Russia. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The financial crisis of 2007-2009 revealed the imperfection of the banking 
regulatory system. Analyzing the lessons from the crises, J. Stiglitz stressed that the 
design of institutions for banking regulation and supervision had become an urgent 
problem even before the latest global shocks. There is a heated debate between 
supporters and opponents of the banking regulation. Some expressed fear that 
through these rules banks could circumvent the basic banking principles while others 
were concerned that regulators might lose their independence. Both approaches to 
regulation did not withstand the crisis. For this reason J. Stiglitz concluded that 
banks need both principles that define the goals and objectives of regulation, and 
rules that allow them to implement these principles in practice (Stiglitz, 2010). 
 
The lessons from the financial crisis made it possible to put the question about the 
need for a fundamentally different mechanism of regulation and supervision in the 
financial sector at the top of the agenda, taking into account the specifics of the 
various segments of financial market and generic interrelationship among them, 
covering all financial institutions and instruments, and preventing regulatory 
arbitrage cases.  
 
Moreover, the activities of regulators and financial institutions should be absolutely 
transparent. At present, in the integrated world, the banking sector failure in one 
country can generate negative externalities for the financial institutions of other 
states. Therefore, the regulation and supervision of financial institutions and 
financial markets should be carried out at the supranational level. At the same time, 
the main goal of such regulation should be financial stability (Lagarde, 2012; 
Thalassinos et al., 2014; 2015).  
 
However new risks may arise in the global economy, which can very quickly spread 
throughout the world. Small shocks, such as, for example, the mortgage default in 
the United States, the uncertain situation with sovereign bonds in Greece, the 
difficulties in the functioning of the Spanish banking system, have a chance to turn 
into global problems for the entire global banking system. Such factors contributing 
to vulnerability of regulatory policies in individual countries significantly increase 
the level of systemic volatility, thereby reducing the possibility of greater stability of 
the international banking system.  
 
In this connection, it can be said that, despite the fact that modern finances are 
characterized by the global nature of their development, the structure of ensuring the 
banking system stability remains predominantly national.  
 
2. Literature Review 
 
The main regulatory efforts of the banking sector are aimed at increasing its rigorous 
compliance with banking standards. However, the costs of tight regulation are quite 
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high, so the question arises regarding their optimization. Innovative efforts in the 
banking sector in recent years have been mainly focused on circumventing reporting 
standards and tax avoidance, as well as increasing the cost of transactions carried out 
by banks. All of this caused an increase in regulatory costs and negative social 
effects. That is, tight regulation is aimed at deterring financial innovations, which is 
not efficient and does not contribute to the modernization of the banking sector 
(Greenspan, 2007). It is necessary to design a regulatory system that promotes 
innovative development and at the same time constrains socially dubious novelties 
(Clarke et al., 2012; Allegret et al., 2016; Ozen et al., 2017). 
 
It should be noted that the conditions for the global financial and economic crisis 
was formed before the start of the active phase of Basel II implementation. Western 
European banks have switched to Basel II more or less in full only since 2008. 
Nevertheless, the Basel Capital Agreement has a number of objective flaws. 
 
First, it is the pro-cyclicality of banking regulation, triggered by an approach to the 
calculation of capital adequacy. According to the Basel documents, the equity 
capital of a commercial bank consist of the sum of tier 1 capital (Tier 1) and Tier 2 
capital (Tier 2). The structure of the second tier may be significantly different in 
individual countries depending on the requirements of the national regulator.  
 
The fundamental problem of implementing standards based on Basel II is that these 
standards contribute to the development of pro-cyclicality of banking regulation. 
When the economy is stable and the risks of shocks are minimal,  the Basel 
Agreement allow a reduction in  requirements for equity capital of banks. During the 
crisis, the requirements for the banks capitalization increase and the economy, which 
at that time needs additional financial resources, enters a recession phase at an 
accelerated rate. Therefore, it turns out that banks interested in making a profit raise 
the amplitude of business fluctuations in general (Akerlof, Schiller, 2010). Thus, the 
credit policy of banks exacerbates cyclicality, and the Basel I and Basel II 
Agreements II do not provide for the development of such a scenario (Boldeanu and 
Tache, 2016; Gorbunova, 2016; Grima and Caruana, 2017; Grima, 2012). 
 
The weighted capital adequacy ratio recorded in the Basel agreement  corresponds to 
the banking sector model with a significant level of financial leverage, which, in 
essence, is similar to the manifestation of the risk of bankruptcy due to a sharp 
change in market conditions (Haldane et al., 2007). The low level of equity capital is 
provoked by both modern tax systems and the desire of bank managers to obtain 
high profits and, consequently, bonuses. Therefore, establishing a minimum amount 
of equity capital dictated by the Basel Agreements makes sense in principle. 
However, this measure resulted in an unexpected outcome - a fixed minimum of 
equity capital has become the norm. 
 
Secondly, as many economists note today, the Basel Agreements encourage 
“intellectual laziness” (Semenko, 2009), since a profound analysis of the asset 
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portfolio risks becomes unnecessary, it is replaced with compliance with capital 
adequacy standards. The bank’s compliance with the capital adequacy ratio is 
misleading for investors; they trust the weighted policy of the bank and at the same 
time trust the assessment of rating agencies, whose market is currently overly 
monopolized.  
 
Nowadays,  the key rating agencies are  Moody’s, Standard & Poor’s (S&P) and 
Fitch Ratings. They are monopolists, since they control about 95% of the global 
ratings market, including: S & P controls 40% of the market, Moody’s - 39% and 
Fitch - 16%. The independent assessment of a counterpart is too expensive. It is 
noteworthy that the Financial Stability Board has developed principles that, in the 
opinion of their authors, are intended to reduce the dependence of market players on 
rating agencies (CRA), namely: 
 
- all legislations, standards and other regulatory documents should specify the  
definitions of creditworthiness, remove references to credit rating agencies and 
develop measures for elaborating a risk management system; 
- all central banks in their assessments should rely on their own opinion 
concerning the risks associated with various financial instruments; 
- credit institutions should rely on their own methods of assessing the 
borrowers’ creditworthiness and publish information on the share of assets for which 
there is no such assessment for various reasons;  
- activity of national regulatory and supervisory authorities should be aimed 
at developing the banking risk management system, as well as providing banking 
supervision; 
- all investment companies and institutional investors should disclose 
information on methods of internal assessment of credit risks and their decisions 
should not be referenced to CRA ratings; 
- a downgrade of the CRA on a counterparty or collateral should not be 
considered by market participants as a signal for a “margin call” situation for 
derivative transactions; 
- securities issuers must comply with the requirements for transparency and 
public disclosure so that investors can independently assess credit risks. 
 
In 2010, the Basel Committee developed a new set of documents containing 
requirements for capital adequacy and capital liquidity for commercial banks, called 
Basel III. "Basel III" can be viewed as a combination of new relevant ways to 
assess risks (credit, market and operational) and the formation of sufficient 
capital, functional supervision and principles of market discipline. Moreover, 
it is the whole set of these measures that relates to risk-based supervision, 
which ensures financial stability. In this connection, it is considered as a new 
paradigm for banking supervision, which should be extended to the entire 
financial system. 
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Starting from 2016, credit organizations are required to establish so-called capital 
buffer not less than 2.5% of net profit.  The buffer should be formed from two equal 
parts of 0.625% each. Before January 1, 2015, banks had to increase the size of the 
equity (authorized) capital to 4.5%, while the amount of capital belonging to Tier 1 - 
to 6%. In 2018, tier 1 capital should lose deferred taxes and securitized assets, which 
give it a 15% “safety cushion”. At the same time, the value of capital adequacy set 
as a norm by regulators related to the first and second tiers is determined by the ratio 
of each of these types of capital to assets weighted by the risks rate (market, credit 
and operational). The resulting value should have reached 8% by January 1, 2013, 
while with the inclusion of “buffer” capital as of January 1, 2019 it should be 10.5%. 
 
“Basel III” contributes to strengthening large credit institutions because they have an 
extensive branch networks. To this end, the Basel Agreement provides for the 
possibility of classify as equity capital their own minority share (must be less than 
10%) in the capital of other financial institutions. 
 
The “Basel III Agreement”, in addition to the characteristics of the quantitative plan, 
implies the implementation of new approaches to banking supervision, involving the 
monitoring and control of compliance by financial institutions with market 
discipline and capital adequacy standards. To achieve this goal, standards for 
disclosing information relating to the risks taken by banks are being introduced. 
Thus, it is assumed to implement the principle of transparency. 
 
Analysts of the Basel Committee have made a forecast of how new principles of 
regulation and supervision in the banking sector will affect macroeconomic 
indicators. According to it, GDP growth rates can reduce in the 35th quarter from 
the moment new requirements for the equity capital of credit institutions are 
implemented, then, in the analysts’ opinion, the GDP growth rate is expected to 
return to the previous level.  
 
The impact of the implementation of the Basel III standards on macroeconomic 
parameters may vary depending on the capitalization of the national banking sector 
and on the decision made by the national regulator on the size of the buffer capital. 
The period during which credit organizations adjust the size and structure of their 
equity capital in accordance with the Basel rules will also affect the GDP. If the 
national regulator insists on the absolute adoption of Basel Agreement, then the 
parameters for reducing GDP growth will still depend on the characteristics of the 
national economy. Experts note that increased control over credit institutions can 
lead to transference of high-risk activity to companies that are not subject to strict 
regulation.This shows that capital flow between regulated and unregulated sectors is 
quite predictable, with consequent adverse effects on the state of the financial sector 
and global sustainability.  
 
Today, the issue of forming a counter-cyclical buffer capital for large financial 
institutions above the minimum normal value remains a matter of discussion. At 
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present, it is generally recognized that the additional financial resources available to 
the bank, severe restrictions on high-risk operations, various structural constrains 
can significantly reduce the risks generated by large businesses and their top 
managers (Paech, 2010). In addition, for the increase of the commercial banks 
manageability in the post-crisis period the following fundamental aspects of banking 
regulation are the most promising: 
 
- the division of regulatory control into over systemically important banks and all 
other commercial banks. To this end, it is necessary to develop criteria for 
classifying a bank as a too-big-to-fail within the framework of national banking 
legislation, which will make it possible to work out a system of preventive 
safeguards to avert the bankruptcy of large banks or assist them in stressful 
situations. For which reason the activities of systemically important banks require 
special more thorough control in accordance with the requirements of antitrust laws.  
-in order to prevent the withdrawing of commercial banks operations out of 
national regulatory agencies control or to take advantage of differences in the modes 
of commercial banks operation in different countries, it is necessary to streamline 
international banking operations by bringing them into line with a single 
international standard. This will be possible through establishing an international 
regulatory body ensuring the development of uniform standards and control over 
their observance. 
- to reduce the level of super-risky, and, accordingly, super-profitable for banks 
operations, it is necessary to capture the conditions for paying remuneration to top 
managers of banks. Since at present there is a conflict of interests between top 
managers and shareholders of banks over the payment of remuneration regardless of 
the credit institution performance, more thought also needs to be given to defining 
parameters for the dependence of bonus payments to top managers on the banks' 
financial performance.  
 
By virtue whereof  the authors substantiate the need to increase the value of the  
capital “buffer”, which should solve the problem of improving the financial situation 
and increasing the financial viability of the largest banks and banking systems. This 
reduces risks and increases the capital “safety cushion”, as well as optimizes the 
impact on the commercial banks’ behavior due to the use of counter-cyclical capital 
regulation requirements. At the same time, this may smooth the movements of the 
economic cyclical development.  
 
In the event that banks had an additional countercyclical buffer reserve for standard 
and non-standard loans not exceeding the calculated value (percentage) of debt on 
standard and non-standard loans, this would ensure the stability of their financial 
performance during the crisis. If, at the beginning of the crisis, banks were allowed 
to restore this additional buffer reserve for standard and non-standard loans, the need 
to form an additional reserve of 100% of troubled and bad loans debt would not 
affect their financial performance.  
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3. Methodology 
 
The value of this additional countercyclical buffer reserve can be calculated on the 
basis of the rate of GDP decline, due to the fact that this indicator has an impact on 
the main performance indicators of commercial banks - return on assets and return 
on equity capital. However, in the course of this research, we may encounter the 
need in addition to the indicator of slow-down in the rate of GDP growth to take into 
account time lags, since in most cases such changes do not affect the main indicators 
of the banking system immediately, but after a while, for example, in a year, two 
years, etc.   
 
That is why in our paper we examine how GDP growth or decline affects the main 
indicators of the banking system profitability, as well as how the state of the banking 
system can change as a result of macroeconomic factors impacts. The object of the 
research is the banking system of developing countries as the most volatile one. 
Such research will make it possible to predict in the future a possible change in the 
banking system, including the probable reduction in its financial stability in unstable 
macroeconomic environment, which makes it necessary to regulate it. As a tool for 
determining causation, we will use the Granger cointegration model.  
 
The economic growth of any country is measured by the rate of its real GDP growth. 
This variable is one of the main indicators of the World Bank WDI (World 
Development Indicators) database4. Variables characterizing bank profits are — 
ROA, (Return On Assets), rand — ROE (Return On Equity). These variables were 
selected as key indicators from the Bank Scope database. We will take them as the 
main indicators of the commercial banks efficiency. 
 
Return On Assets (ROA) reflects the profitability of banks' assets and takes into 
account various bank balance-sheet-related financing transactions. Most of the 
researchers by calculating the ROA estimate mainly the ability of the bank’s 
management to administer the bank’s income and expenditures, while generating 
extra profit ( Rashid, Dewan Arif  et al., 2011). ROA as an indicator of profitability 
is commonly used to characterize the profitability of commercial banks (Turgutlu, 
2014) .  
 
Return On Equity (ROE) is the profitability ratio of banks' equity capital; it allows to 
evaluate not only the profitability of commercial banks, but also the growth of 
equity capital and, as a consequence, the capacity of the banking system, enabling 
commercial banks to be financially viable. In recent years, commercial banks 
profitability has tended to increase. 
 
                                                     
4https://data.worldbank.org/indicator?tab=all 
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In general, the profitability of the entire banking sector at the end of 2017 was about 
1%, the return on capital was about 8.3% (in 2016, 1.2% and 10.3%); the return on 
assets of credit institutions in 2017 was 1.0%, return on equity - 8.3% (a year earlier 
- 1.2 and 10.3%, respectively). State-controlled banks were the most profitable in 
2017, their return on their assets was 2.1%, and the return on equity - 16.1%. Good 
results were also demonstrated by banks controlled by non-residents (2.4 and 13.8%, 
respectively). 
 
Table 1. Profitability ratio for groups of banks in Russia5 
Groups of credit institution 
Return on Assets, % Return on Equity, % 
2016 2017 2016 2017 
Banks controlled by the state 1.9 2.1 15.8 16.1 
Banks controlled by non-residents 
1.8 2.4 11.4 13.8 
Private banks with a capital of more 
than 1 billion rubles. 
0.4 1.4 3.3 10.9 
Private banks with a capital of less 
than 1 billion rubles. 
0.1 -0.01 0.5 -0.1 
For reference: systemically 
important credit organizations 
1.9 1.7 15.7 13.5 
 
The rate of real GDP growth reflects the macroeconomic environment of a country, 
in other words, economic activity in the country. A large number of empirical 
studies have shown that the rate of real GDP growth has a positive effect on the 
banking profitability (Ductor, Lorenzo, and Daryna Grechyna. 2015).  Taking into 
account the rate of GDP growth allows having in mind the stage of the economic 
cycle, as well as its current shape. Some researchers speak about the positive effect 
of GDP growth rates on the profitability of commercial banks and the banking 
system as a whole (Bikker, Jacob A., and Haixia Hu. 2002), while the economic 
downturn leads to declined profitability and losses of commercial banks.  
 
Table 2. Macroeconomic data in Russia for the period from 2007 to 2017 
 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Return on 
Assets of 
the 
banking 
system, % 
3.0  1.8  0.7  1.9 2.4 2.3 1.9 0.9 0.3 1.2 1.0 
Return on 22.7  13.3  4.9  12.5 17.6 18.2 15.2 7.9 2.3 10.3 8.3 
                                                     
5Review of the banking sector of the Russian Federation by year (Internet version). 
[Electronic resource]. 
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Equity of 
the 
banking 
system, % 
GDP 
growth 
rate,% 
108.7 105.2 92.2 104.5 104.3 103.5 101.3 100,7 97.2 99.8 101.7 
 
In the course of analyzing macroeconomic indicators, we very often encounter the 
fact that in most cases time series are non-stationary, that is, their stochastic 
specifications change over time. To such time series we can attribute GDP growth, 
levels of price, consumption and many other things. To analyse such time series, it is 
common to use differences or carry out some kind of transformation (seasonally 
adjusted); in this case their stationarity is achieved and after that an analysis is 
carried out.  
 
Nevertheless, present-day studies offer a fundamentally different approach to the 
analysis of non-stationary time series; one of this kind of research is cointegration. It 
allows not only eliminating the spurious regression, but also showing the cause / 
effect relationship of non-stationary indicators in the body of interest. If we want to 
obtain as much information as possible related to the object of analysis, in this case - 
the banking system, we must compare not only the linear values occurring in one 
period of time, but also explore the dynamics and evolution of variables, that is, take 
their past values into account given the time lag. 
 
We can understand cointegration as a tool in the field of macroeconomic theory, 
bearing in mind the fact that most of the indicators are non-stationary. At the same 
time, there are a number of stable stationary relations in the economy, to which we 
can add non-stationary series as factor ones. In other words, cointegration reflects 
the mathematical formulation of observed stability; in addition, it is a tool for testing 
proposed macroeconomic hypotheses, and in the case of accepting such a 
hypothesis, it is possible to determine a quantitative assessment of the developed 
hypotheses.  
 
The idea of cointegration was first presented in the works by Granger (Granger, 
1981)  and was further developed in the works by Engle, Granger and a number of 
other scholars (Engle, Granger, 1987). The Granger test assumes that information 
relating to the prediction of variables is contained only in the time series of these 
variables. In so doing, the Granger test consists in evaluating the following 
regression equation (1): 
 
yt= + +εt.i,                                                        (1) 
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where  and ,k-time lag, и ε-error of the regression. 
We can express the specification of our model in two equations:  
 
The dependence of Return on Assets on GDP growth (equation 2). 
ROAit= +
+εt.i                                     (2) 
The dependence of Return on Equity on GDP growth (equation 3). 
 
ROEit= +
+εt.i                                                         (3) 
At the very beginning of the cointegration regression test, we should check the time 
series for stationarity by means of the Dickey-Fuller test (DF-test, Dickey - Fuller 
test), which is one of the methods for unit root test. 
 
Let us formulate the main and alternative hypotheses: hypothesis H0: - the process is 
non-stationary; hypothesis H1: - the process is stationary of the first order.  To verify 
the cointegration of two time series of ROA (ROE) and GDP in this work we used 
the Granger method, according to which the study will be conducted according to 
the following scheme: 1) the order of the time series data integration is determined; 
2) based on the least squares method the cointegration equation is estimated; 3) 
using the Dickey-Fuller test, the regression residuals of this equation are 
investigated for stationarity; the main hypothesis is that the ROA and ROE indices 
are not cointegrated with GDP; 4) if, according to the results of the Dickey-Fuller 
test, the residuals are stationary, then the main hypothesis is rejected, and the time 
series ROA and ROE with GDP are co-integrated. 
 
In order to test the time series for integrability, we calculate the Student's t-statistic 
for a parameter and compare it with the upper and lower threshold values of the DF-
statistic from the Dickey-Fuller test table (Table 3).     
 
Table 3. Dickey-Fuller augmented test results for ROA and ROE 
unit root testing for ROA unit root testing for ROE 
including one lag for (1-L) ROA 
Sample scope 9 
null unit root hypothesis: a = 1 
including one lag for (1-L) ROE 
Sample scope 9 
null unit root hypothesis: a = 1 
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  test without constant  
  model: (1-L)y = (a-1)*y(-1) + ... + e 
  score for (a - 1):  -0.152305 
  test statistics: tau_nc(1) =-0,926097 
  Asymptote of p-value 0.3155 
  1st order autocorrelation coefficient for 
e: -0.033 
test without constant  
  model: (1-L)y = (a-1)*y(-1) + ... + e 
  score for (a - 1): -0.150801 
  test statistics: tau_nc(1) =-0,899057 
  Asymptote of p-value 0.3269 
  1st order autocorrelation coefficient for e: -
0.022 
 
 
In our case, for n observations, the value of the t-statistic is larger than the lower 
critical value (0.05), therefore, in both cases, both for ROA and ROE, we accept the 
null hypothesis and can say that the process is non-stationary, that is, it either does 
not integrate at all, or integrates at a higher order (Table 4). 
 
Table 4. Dickey-Fuller augmented test results for GDP 
Unit root testing for ROA of GDP  Unit root testing for ROE of GDP 
including one lag for (1-L) GDP 
Sample scope 9 
null unit root hypothesis: a = 1 
  test without constant  
  model: (1-L)y = (a-1)*y(-1) + ... + e 
  score for (a - 1): -0.00885711 
  test statistics: tau_nc(1) =-0,404445 
  Asymptote of p-value 0.5383 
  1st order autocorrelation coefficient for e: 
-0.234 
 
including one lag for (1-L) GDP 
Sample scope 9 
null unit root hypothesis: a = 1 
  test without constant  
  model: (1-L)y = (a-1)*y(-1) + ... + e 
  score for (a - 1): -0.00862405 
  test statistics: tau_nc(1) =-0,392881 
  Asymptote of p-value 0.5427 
  1st order autocorrelation coefficient for e: -
0.235 
 
 
Since the asymptomatic value of p is large enough, there is no reason to reject the 
null hypothesis concerning the presence of a unit root (the series can be considered 
as non-stationary).  Next, we calculate the cointegration regression for ROA and 
ROE for the period 2007-2017 (Tables 5 and 6). 
 
Table 5. Cointegration regression for ROA-least square method, on the basis of 
observations 2007-2017 (T = 11) 
                   Standard error of            t-statistics           for P-value 
  --------------------------------------------------------------- 
  GDP         0,0157924     0,00227619      6,938               4,00e-05  *** 
  Mean dep. variable                                         1.581818 
  St. dev. of dep. variable                                  0.825613 
  Residual sum of squares                                 5.906764 
  St. model error                                                0.768555 
  Uncentered R-square                                      0.827992 
  Centered R-square                                          0.133443 
  Log-likelihood                                               -12.18844 
  Akaike Information  Criterion                        26.37688 
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  Schwarz  Criterion (SC)                                 26.77478 
  Hannan-Quinn  information criterion (HQC)  26.12606 
   Rho Parameter                                               0.380574 
  Durbin–Watson  Statistic                               0.945313 
 
Table 6. Cointegration regression for ROE-MNK, on the basis of observations 
2007-2017 (T = 11) 
                                      standard error of    t-statistics       for P-value 
  --------------------------------------------------------------- 
  GDP         0,120783      0,0168390        7,173       3,02e-05  *** 
  Mean dep. variable    12.10909 
  St. dev. of dep. variable    6.117427 
  Residual sum of squares    323.3839 
  St. model error     5.686685 
 Uncentered R-square    0.837263 
  Centered R-square    0.135867 
  Log-likelihood     -34.20352 
 Akaike Criterion    70.40704 
 Schwarz  Criterion (SC) 7  0.80494 
 Hannan-Quinn information criterion (SC)   70.15622 
  Rho Parameter      0.320909 
  Durbin–Watson Statistic   1.057343 
 
To support the cointegration, we will carry out an augmented Dickey-Fuller test for 
residuals of the model in terms of ROA and ROE. Let us make the main hypothesis: 
the time series of ROA (ROE) and GDP indicators are not cointegrated. To verify 
the main hypothesis, we calculate the regression residuals of the resulting equation, 
and examine them for stationarity using the Dickey-Fuller augmented test. 
According to the results of the ADF – test, the regression residuals are stationary, 
therefore, the null hypothesis of the absence of cointegration between time series of 
indicators is disproved. In other words, the time series of the examined ROA (ROE) 
and GDP coefficients are cointegrated (Table 7). 
 
Table 7. Augmented Dickey-Fuller test for GDP results 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test for uhat 
including one lag for (1-L)uhatROA 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test for uhat 
including one lag for (1-L)uhat ROE 
null unit root hypothesis: a = 1 
  model: (1-L)y = (a-1)*y(-1) + ... + e 
  score for (a - 1): -0.719581 
  test statistics: tau_nc(2) =-2,14053 
  Asymptote of p-value 0.01864 
  1st order autocorrelation coefficient for 
e: 0.034 
 null unit root hypothesis: a = 1 
  model: (1-L)y = (a-1)*y(-1) + e 
  score for (a - 1): -0.9373 
  test statistics: tau_nc(2) =-2,66827 
  P-value 0.02815 
  1st order autocorrelation coefficient for e: 
0.050 
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Thus the conducted research supported the hypothesis that Return on Assets of the 
banking system (ROА) depends on GDP growth, and Return on Equity (ROE) also 
depends on GDP growth, but this dependence does not manifest itself immediately 
due to the time lag. In our case, the variables take the greatest degree of 
cointegration with the time lag, which equals 1 year, that is, the greatest impact of 
the GDP change rates on the profitability of the banking system is witnessed after 
this time. Our Granger test showed that all variables are cointegrated, which 
indicates their long-term equilibrium relationship and authenticity of correlation.  
 
Taking into account the revealed dependence, maintaining the required level of 
profitability and sustainability of commercial banks in the context of the impact of 
global a macroeconomic risks require an adjustment of the system of banking 
activities regulation and supervision in developing countries.  
 
4. Conclusions 
 
The cyclical development of the economies of developing countries is becoming 
increasingly evident, which is manifested in a decrease in the GDP growth rates 
under the impact of the financial crisis. In this connection, the creation by 
megaregulators the system of pro-cyclical regulation of the banking system 
development should become an important instrument for controlling the banking 
system.  
 
In our opinion, the main instrument for regulating banking capital should remain a 
counter-cyclical capital buffer, the main purpose of which is to contain extremely 
rapid credit growth during periods of economic boom.  The most important problem 
in this case is the search for indicators by which it would be justified to activate the 
countercyclical capital buffer. To this end, the Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision offered assessments based on calculating the deviation of the actual 
data from the long-term trend, formed with the use of the Hodrick-Prescott filter. If 
the deviation is much higher than the resulting value, this indicates the need to 
accept additional requirements for the adequacy of core capital.  
 
However, in a crisis, these indicators are insufficient, since they do not reflect the 
state of the banks’ credit policy. In this connection, the authors attempted to 
identify and substantiate more realistic indicators of countercyclical buffer 
assessment for developing countries. To this end, we estimated the most important 
macroeconomic indicators (the level of GDP and the volume of loans granted to 
non-financial organizations) for the period from 2009 to 2017 inclusive. The data 
were presented as quarterly figures for the above mentioned period.  
 
Based on the econometric model of least squares, the authors identified 
interrelationships of the main banking indicators, which allowed us to prove the 
possibility of using an indicator for the assessment of a countercyclical buffer that 
reflects the ratio of loans to non-financial organizations (legal entities) to GDP, 
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which, according to the authors, allows the most realistic assessment of the situation 
in the country's credit system. 
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